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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20070526-CA

v.
DAWN MARIE DOWNS,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility,
a second degree felony (R. 170-72).

This Court has jurisdiction

over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (West
2004) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In this prosecution for drug possession, did the trial court
reasonably admit, over defendant's rule 401 and 403 objections,
evidence of how police came to find drugs in her pants pocket?
An appellate court reviews the decision of a trial court "to
admit or exclude evidence under [r]ule 403 [using] an abuse of
discretion standard."

State v. Castillo, 2007 UT App 324, SI 6,

170 P.3d 1147 (citation omitted).

A lower court's decision to

admit evidence will not be reversed "unless it is ^beyond the
limits of reasonability.'" Id. (quoting State v. Hamilton,, 827
P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, defines "relevant
evidence:"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, governs the exclusion of
relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of
time:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony (R.
2-3).

The information was subsequently amended to one count of

possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility,
a second degree felony (R. 103-04).

A jury convicted defendant

of the amended charge (R. 156). The court sentenced her to a
suspended term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison,
180 days in the county jail, 36 months of supervised probation, a
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fine, and conditions of probation (R. 170-72).

Defendant filed a

timely notice of appeal (R. 173).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Around 11 o'clock on a November night in 2005, police
officers executed a search warrant targeting a drug distribution
operation at 2965 South 700 East in Salt Lake City (R. 184: 11516).

The warrant specifically named Brian Stevens, who had twice

sold drugs to a confidential informant and who had been under
police surveillance for several weeks, and also generally
referenced "all persons present at the home" (Id. at 141, 148).
Stevens' girlfriend, the defendant in this case, had been living
with Stevens for two to three years and was at home when the
police arrived with the warrant (Id. at 121, 130, 145, 207, 223;
R. 185: 256).

In searching the home, officers found

methamphetamine, packaging materials commonly used in drug
distribution, other materials used to store and secret drugs, and
more than $4000 in cash in a safe in the closet of the couple's
bedroom (R. 184: 121-28).

Defendant told the officer in charge

that "she didn't know anything that was going on in the home and
didn't want to talk to [him]." Id. at 132; accord R. 185: 303.
In executing the warrant, officers utilized standard police
procedure, including identifying and running warrants checks on
all persons present (R. 184: 129-30).

When the officers ran a

warrants check on defendant, they discovered two outstanding
misdemeanor justice court warrants, wholly unrelated to the
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search warrant they were executing (Id. at 131, 167, 175) .
Defendant was transported to jail on the outstanding warrants
(Id. at 167).
Prior to turning defendant over to jail personnel for
admittance, the transportation officer asked her if she had
"[a]ny kind of weapons or contraband, [or] controlled substances''''
with her "because if they take anything into the jail[,] it's an
additional charge" (Id. at 168-69).

A jail worker later asked

defendant the same question (Id. at 156, 160).

She maintained

that she did not (Id. at 157, 169). When the jail worker
subsequently searched defendant, however, the worker found a
small plastic baggie of methamphetamine in the right front coin
pocket of her pants (Id. at 157-58, 171-72).

A Utah Crime

Laboratory technician testified that both the unusual pink color
of the plastic baggie found in the pants and the appearance of
the methamphetamine itself was consistent with the baggies and
drugs found in the home (Id. at 193, 197, 198). Nonetheless,
defendant told the worker "that she didn't know where that
[baggie of methamphetamine] came from and that it was not hers"
(Id. at 162).
Defendant did not contest that she physically possessed the
methamphetamine.

Instead, she maintained that her possession was

not intentional or knowing (R. 185: 319-23).

Her defense rested

on activities that occurred earlier on November 30, just a few
hours before police executed the warrant (Id. at 329-30).
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Defendant's girlfriends, Karen and Misty, testified that
they, along with one additional friend, had planned a joint
birthday lunch at Chuck-A-Rama on November 30 (R. 184: 204, 213).
When Karen arrived at defendant's home to pick her up, defendant
was not ready to go, so the women decided to drive to Thrift
Town, a nearby used clothing store, to find some "good deals''
while waiting for defendant (Id. at 205, 208-09).
Karen, who had worked at Thrift Town, testified that much of
the clothing sold at Thrift Town was not washed before being
sold, and that employees did not routinely check the pockets of
the clothing (Id. at 218, 230). Consequently, she occasionally
found things—such as Kleenex, a rubber, and a $10 bill—in pockets
of Thrift Town clothing (IdL. at 219, 231).
Karen testified that she bought two shirts and two or three
pairs of pants that afternoon.

She put them in her car, along

with several other pairs of pants she had previously purchased
for her grown daughter (Id. at 210-11, 226-27).

The women then

returned to defendant's home to pick her up, and they all drove
to the restaurant together (Id. at 212-13, R. 185: 252, 267).
Karen and Misty testified that, as they reached the
restaurant parking lot, defendant had a "cough attack" that
resulted in her urinating in her pants (R. 184: 215, R. 185: 252,
2 68).

Karen remembered the pants she had purchased for her

daughter and pressed defendant to try on one of those pairs
instead of taking the time to return home to change (R. 184:
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215, 229; R. 185: 252-53, 269-70).

Defendant found a pair of

pants that fit, wore them for lunch, and eventually returned home
(R. 184: 217, 220; R. 185: 253, 273). Later that night, when the
police officers found the methamphetamine in her pocket,
defendant was still wearing the Thrift Town pants.

Defendant

thus argued that the pants in which the methamphetamine was found
were not hers and that she did not knowingly or intentionally
possess the drug.
After considering the evidence, the jury convicted defendant
of possession of a controlled substance in a correctional
facility, a second degree felony (R. 156).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant sought exclusion of all evidence relating to the
execution of the search warrant for drug distribution that
targeted the man with whom she lived.

She argued that the

evidence was both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, and thus
violated rules 401 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The

trial court admitted the evidence.
The trial court's ruling was not "beyond the limits of
reasonability."
1992).

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah

Pursuant to rule 401, the evidence was plainly relevant.

First, evidence that defendant had outstanding justice court
warrants was relevant to explain why she was at the jail and
subject to the search that revealed the drugs.

It provided the

necessary factual predicate for the jury to understand how and
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why the methamphetamine was found.

Second, evidence that

methamphetamine and unusual, small pink baggies were found in
defendant's home makes defendant's knowledge and intent to
possess the same drug packagec. In the same colored baggie more
probable than if the jury did not have the evidence about the
drug:

ie home.
Pursuant to rule 403, the probative value of this relevant

evidence was not substantia] ] y outweii:1' --• ? • ^ the danger :>f i 11 if ad r
prejudice or confusion of the issues.

The evidence was highly

probative, both of her knowledge and intent and of the
circumstances leading up to the discovery of methamphetamine on
her person.

And as the trial court determined, any prejudice was

"minimal," well below "undu[] > ] prejudd c[d a 3 ] .' '

Defendant has

wholly failed to articulate how mere knowledge of two misdemeanor
warrants could have s :> inflamed the jury a s to convict 1 Ier c i I 1:1 ie
basis of those warrants rather than on the basis of the
methamphetamine found in her pocket.

Similarly, she offers no

cogent explanation of how the items found in the house likely so
confused the jury as to cause the jury to convict her improperly.
Because the trial court's decision was not "beyond the limits of
reasonability," this Court should affirm it.

Castillo, 2007 UT

App 32 ^
Defendant also argues that the evidence should have been
excluded pursuant to rule 404(b).
multiple grounds.

This argument fai"1 - n

First, defendant failed to preserve it below.
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Second, even if the Court considers the argument, it should be
rejected because the evidence does not fall within the ambit of
rule 404(b).

Finally, even if this Court were to reach the issue

and determine that rule 404(b) applies, the evidence was
introduced for clear, non-character purposes. For these reasons,
defendant's rule 404(b) claim fails.
ARGUMENT
IN THIS PROSECUTION FOR DRUG
POSSESSION IN A CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY, THE TRIAL COURT
REASONABLY ADMITTED, OVER RULE 401
AND 403 OBJECTIONS, EVIDENCE OF HOW
POLICE CAME TO FIND DRUGS IN
DEFENDANT'S PANTS POCKET BECAUSE
THAT EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT TO
DEFENDANT'S INTENT AND KNOWLEDGE
THAT SHE POSSESSED METHAMPHETAMINE
AND WAS UNLIKELY TO HAVE CAUSED THE
JURY TO CONVICT HER ON AN IMPROPER
BASIS
Prior to trial, defense counsel objected to the admission of
evidence detailing the execution of the search warrant at the
home defendant shared with Brian Stevens, the named target of a
drug distribution investigation.

Counsel argued that this

evidence was both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial and thus
violated rules 401 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Br. of Aplt. at 14.

See

Specifically, counsel asserted that because

defendant was not charged with anything found in her home,
evidence about what was found there would be irrelevant and
confusing and would prejudice the jury against her.
17.
8

Id. at 15-

Ii I rejecting defendant's argument, the trial court first
determined that the evidence w a s relevant.

The court reasoned:

"[T]he burden on the State is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
[defendan

| knowledge and intent into [sic] possessing the

methamphetamine.
[defendanl
relevant"

[T]his evidence goes directly to

knowledge an• i i nten 1:; therefore, i t :i s a 1: • s c «.1 I 1 1 = 1 y
-. _

18 or addendum A ) .

Thus, because the evidence

directly addressed the mens rea of t: 1 Ie charge• i crime t
clearly relevant.

:i t v, as

Second, the court weighed whether or not the

evidence was prejudicial or confusing.

Determining that it was

not, the count stated:
It is not confusing to [the jury], . . . 1L
actually gives them context. . . [I]n order
to prove . . . possession of a controlled
substance the State has got to prove that
[defendant] possessed the methamphetamine.
Whether or not that is shown at the jail or
at another place is not more prejudicial to
[defendant]. . . [T]he fact that it comes in
in the context that it was at a search
warrant at a residence where she was . . .
goes directly to her knowledge and lack of
mistake. So that goes specifically to . , ,
the State's ability to enter this in its case
in chief.

[A]nything that makes the possession more
knowing, more intentional, more likely than
not is by definition relevant, and the
prejudice is simply not extensive at all.
The only prejudice that goes to [defendant]
is that she possessed an . . . unlawful
controlled substance.
Id. at 18-19 or addendum A.

The court thus determined that 11:le

evidence was not confusing and that any minimal prejudice was not
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unfair.

Because the court concluded that the evidence presented

no danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues, that
evidence could not substantially outweigh its highly probative
value.

The court, therefore, admitted the evidence.

Id. at 18.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling.
A.

Rules 401 and 403 govern this case.

Evidence is relevant if it possesses "any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."

Utah R. Evid. 401.

This

means that "even evidence that is only slightly probative in
value is relevant."

State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, 1 31, 44 P.3d

805 (citing State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 27, 994 P.2d 177).
Because even evidence with minimal probative value is relevant,
the standard for determining the relevancy of evidence is "very
low."

State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, M

12, 16, 973 P.2d 404

(quoting Edward L* Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law
4-2 (1996)).
Applying this low threshold, the evidence in this case is
relevant.1

Evidence that defendant had outstanding justice court

warrants was relevant to explain why she was admitted to jail and
thus subject to the search that revealed the drugs.
1

It provided

Defendant on appeal objects generally to all "evidence at
trial relating to the search warrant and drug activity at the
house" (Br. of Aplt. at 18). For analytical purposes, the State
draws a distinction between the evidence of the outstanding
warrants and the physical evidence found in the home.
10

the necessary factual predicate for the jury to understand how
and why the methamphetamine was found.

Evidence that particular

drugs and distinctive pink baggies were found in defendant's home
was relevant because '• made defendant' s 1 knowledge ai id intent to
possess the same drugs packaged in the same way more probable
than :i f 1:1: 1 e j ury did not have the evidence about the di ags :i i i the
home.

That is, the methamphetamine and packaging found in

defendant's home was consistent with the methamphetamine and
packaging found in her pocket, and so undermines the credibility
of her claims that she knew nothing about what was going on in
the home and had no knowledge of, nor any intent to, possess the
methamphetamine found in her pocket.
Once a

determines that evidence :is relevant,

then decide whether the "probative value (of the evidence) i.substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejud'"
confusion of the issues."

Utah R. Evid. 403.

r

^

Rule 403 is an

"inclusionary rule," and "presumes the admission of all relevant
evidence except where the evidence has

x

an unusual propensity to

unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead' the jury."

State v.

Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted).
On appeal, review of a 403 ruling, as with rule 401, ' ,"limited," with the tria1 court accorded "wide lat * :•- "

State

v. Bovd, 2001 UT 30, 1 23, 25 P.3d 985 (citation omitted).
The 403 inquiry involves balancing the probative value of
the evidence against its unfairly prejudicial or confusing effect
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to determine whether the unfairly prejudicial or confusing effect
"substantially outweighs" the probative value.

The Utah Supreme

Court has elaborated upon what constitutes "unfair prejudice":
Since all effective evidence is prejudicial
in the sense of being damaging to the party
against whom it is offered, prejudice which
calls for exclusion is given a more
specialized meaning: an undue tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly but not necessarily an emotional
one, such as bias, sympathy, hatred,
contempt, retribution or horror.
State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989).

The fact that

evidence is prejudicial does not alone render it incompetent.
Indeed,

XN>

[t]he exclusion of relevant evidence under rule 403 is

an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly.'"

Woods v. Zeluff,

2007 UT App 84, 58, 158 P.3d 552 (citing K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss
Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1155 (10th Cir. 1985)).
Here, the evidence detailing the execution of the warrant
at defendant's home, including the drugs, money, and
paraphernalia found there, and the two unrelated outstanding
misdemeanor warrants against her were highly probative of her
knowledge and intent and of the circumstances leading up to the
discovery of the methamphetamine on her person.

And, as the

trial court determined, that evidence was not "unduly"
prejudicial within the meaning of rule 403 because it did not
have "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis."

Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984.
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E v i d e n c e about d e f e n d a n t ' s o u t s t a n d i n g m i s d e m e a n o r w a r r a n t s
had n o t e n d e n c y t o i n f l a m e the jury or m o t i v a t e t h e m to convict
her o n a n y i m p r o p e r b a s i s .

T w o p o l i c e o f f i c e r s t e s t i f i e d about

the standard p r o c e d u r e s used d/urii i 1 g search w a r r a n t e x e c u t i o n ,
i n c l u d i n g r u n n i n g w a r r a n t s checks o n a l l p e r s o n s p r e s e n t in t h e
home

(R

1 8 4 i ] 3 0 3 3 , 166-67).

T h e f act tha 1: office r s :ii s cov ered

that d e f e n d a n t h a d t w o o u t s t a n d i n g m i s d e m e a n o r w a r r a n t s
only w h y s h e w a s t r a n s p o r t e d t o j a i l .

explained

It e x p l a i n e d t h e

c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d set t h e scene f o r t h e s u b s e q u e n t search o f h e r
person and discovery of methamphetamine.

It d i d n o t , h o w e v e r ,

suggest that t h e jury should c o n v i c t h e r o n t h e b a s i s of t h e
misdemeanor warrants.

Indeed, it is d i f f i c u l t t o s u r m i s e h o w t h e

jury could h a v e b e e n i m p r o p e r l y i n f l u e n c e d b y t h e u n s p e c i f i e d
m i s d e m e a n o r w a r r a n t s in light of t h e e v i d e n c e that s h e h a d
c o m m i t t e d a f a r m o r e s e r i o u s second d e g r e e felony.

Where

defendant has wholly failed to explain how mere knowledge of
t h e s e o u t s t a n d i n g m i s d e m e a n o r w a r r a n t s could have so i n f l a m e d t h e
jury as t o c o n v i c t h e r o f a second d e g r e e felony o n t h e b a s i s of
t h o s e w a r r a n t s rather t h a n t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d at t r i a l , h e r
claim fails.
S i m i l a r l y , e v i d e n c e about w h a t w a s found in t h e h o m e d i d n o t
have a n u n d u e t e n d e n c y to suggest that t h e jury si101 lid convict
defendant on an improper basis.

R e n e w i n g h e r t r i a l court

a r g u m e n t , d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s that t h e d r u g s , p a r a p h e r n a l i a , a n d
cash found in the home created the potential for so much
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confusion that the evidence should be excluded (Br. of Aplt. at
17-18).

Had defendant been charged only with possession of a

controlled substance, the jury might well have been confused
about whether that charge was directed at the drugs found in her
home or on her person.

The state, however, amended the original

information to one count of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance in
103-04.

a correctional

facility.

Compare R. 2-3 with R.

In addition, the jury was specifically instructed that,

to convict defendant, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant "was within a correctional facility" when she possessed
the drugs (R. 136). Thus, the trial court ensured that evidence
related to the search warrant would not cause confusion for the
jury.
Moreover, evidence about defendant's living environment was
no more prejudicial that it was probative.

That is, while the

drugs in the home damaged her credibility, they did not do so
unfairly.

The evidence in her home simply undermined her

credibility when she maintained she knew nothing about the drugs
in her pocket.

Defendant has wholly failed to articulate why she

thinks this evidence would cause the jury to convict her on an
improper basis.
The ruling in this case to admit the evidence pursuant to
rule 403 thus falls well within the ambit of evidence that tells
the story of the charged crime or explains the circumstances
surrounding the crime.

See, e.g. , Boyd, 2001 UT 30 at SI 24
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(admitting evidence of "nicknames, chants, and dances'7 because it
provided background for the rape that followed); State v.
Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978)(allowing evidence that
defendant hdd siphoned gas to fuel a stolen car because it
"explain[ed] the circumstances surrounding the

. crime [of

car theft] ), • State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d '

• .i

1986)(admitting evidence that defendant paid for stolen property
with marijuana because it was relevant 1 :« : > she w ""general
circumstances surrounding defendant's purchase, receipt, and
retention of the stolen property").
The trial court admitted the evidence in this case because
it was "absolutely relevant" and, therefore, highly probative and
because the prejudice was "not extensive at all" (R, 184: 19) . •
In the court's judgment, the balancing required by rule 403
tipped heavily for admissioi I.

This decision was not "^beyond the

limits of reasonability'" and should, therefore, be affirmed.
Castillo, 2007 UT App 324, 1 6 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827
P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)).
B.

Rule 404(b)

On appeal, counsel also argues that the trial court's
decision to admit the evidence violated rule 404(b).2
2

To demonstrate the court's abuse of discretion, counsel
engages in a lengthy rule 404(b) argument, applying the analysis
articulated in State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), See.
Br. of Aplt. at 10-11, 14-18. Rule 404(b) provides for the
admissibility of prior bad acts evidence if that evidence has a
non-character purpose, is relevant, and possesses probative value
that is not substantially outweighed by a non-character purpose.
15

Defendant's claim based on rule 404(b) is not properly before
this Court.
argument.

At trial, counsel did not assert a rule 404(b)
See R. 184: 13-17.

Because she did not, her rule

404(b) argument is not preserved and should not be considered on
appeal.

See, e.g., State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12

(Utah 1993) (xx[t]rial counsel must state clearly and specifically
all grounds for objection" in order to preserve issue for
appeal).

Neither has defendant asserted plain error or

exceptional circumstances, the two main exceptions to the
preservation rule.

The law is well-settled that appellate courts

generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal.

See, e.g., Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of E d u c , 797

P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990).

Where defendant has failed to argue

an exception to the preservation rule, this Court should not
consider her claim. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5
(Utah 1995).
Even assuming arguendo that defendant had preserved such an
argument, evidence that a search warrant was executed at
defendant's home does not implicate evidence within the scope of

Shickles outlines factors to be used in the balancing of
probativeness against prejudice. In essence, Shickles
articulates a rule 403 analysis within the context of rule
404(b). The State has been unable to locate any cases in which
the Shickles factors have been applied outside the context of a
rule 404(b) analysis. That is, when cases present rule 403
issues, but do not involve rule 404(b), courts do not engage in a
Shickles analysis. See, e.g., State v. Castillo, 2007 UT App 324,
170 P.3d 1147; Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84, 158 P.3d 552;
State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d. 981 (Utah 1989). This Court should
continue this practice.
16

rule 404(b).

The evidence found at the home and the outstanding

misdemeanor warrants were introduced as an integral part of the
essential story of this crime, providing background necessary for
the jury to have a complete picture of the crime.

See Pierce,

722 P.2d at 782 (holding that evidence showing "the general
circumstances surrounding" the crime should not be excluded as
"prior crimes" evidence); United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269,
272 (10th Cir. 1995) (evidence is admissible when it provides
context for the crime, "is necessary to a full presentation of
the case, or is appropriate in order to complete the story of the
crime. . .by proving its immediate context or the res gestae"
(quoting U.S. v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir.
1980))(internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, absent the evidence of the outstanding
misdemeanor warrants, the jury would have been left to wonder why
defendant was taken to jail and on what basis the officer
searched her.

Absent evidence of the drugs found in the home,

the jury also would have been left without evidence critical to
establishing defendant's intent and knowledge to possess the
drugs.

In essence, the evidence defendant sought to exclude was

relevant background for the crime with which she was charged.
such, the trial court properly determined that it was governed
not by rule 404(b), but by rules 401 and 403.

See, e.g., Boyd,

2001 UT 30 at 11 23-24 (and cases cited therein).

17

As

Finally, even assuming arguendo that the evidence about the
search warrant execution did fall within the ambit of rule
404(b), the evidence would nonetheless be admissible because it
served a clear non-character purpose.

Evidence of the drugs

found in the home related directly to defendant's knowledge and
intent to possess the drugs that were found in her pocket at the
jail directly after police executed the warrant.

And evidence

that she had outstanding justice court warrants explained why she
was taken to the jail where the search revealing the drugs in her
pocket occurred.

See State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4

(Utah App. 1991) (holding that although rule 404 contains no
express exception for "background information" showing how the
charges came forward, "the prosecutor is entitled to paint a
factual picture of the context in which the events in question
transpired").
Defendant's rule 404(b) argument thus fails on multiple
grounds.

At the outset, defendant failed to preserve it below.

Moreover, even if the Court considers the argument, it should be
rejected because the evidence does not fall within the ambit of
rule 404(b).

And finally, even if this Court determines that

rule 404(b) applies, the evidence was introduced for clear, noncharacter purposes. For these reasons, defendant's rule 404(b)
claim fails.

18

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count of possession of a controlled substance
in a correctional facility, a second degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /5^day of February, 2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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relevant to the case.

2

address the Court on that.

3

and also the facts of this case, and she wanted to just address

4

the Court on that issue.

5
6
7

THE COURT:

Once again, Ms. Fulkerson would like to
She's done some research on the law

All right.

Thank you.

What are your

concerns, Ms. Fulkerson?
MS. FULKERSON:

Thank you again, your Honor.

8

just a basic 401 (inaudible) 3 argument, your Honor.

9

that this is clearly irrelevant to her arrest.

This is
I think

I think that it

10

would also unduly prejudice and confuse the jury in this case.

11

Where we have a drug case, a possession of controlled

12

substance and we have the search warrant relating to what it

13

related to, but where she was not actually arrested in connection

14

with that warrant I think clearly would be prejudicial in this

15

case and I would ask that it be excluded on those grounds.

16

THE COURT:

All right.

Was Ms. Downs'listed on the

17

search warrant as a party that would be present. St the place

18

being searched.

19
20
21
22
23

Do --

MR. BLAYLOCK:

She was not specifically listed; however,

the search warrant says, "and search all persons present."
THE COURT:

Persons there.

All right.

Thank you.

Response, Mr. Blaylock?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Your Honor, there are a number of facts

24

that were determined at the scene that relate to her knowledge,

25

lack of mistake and things of that nature.

One of those
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particular is that the controlled substances that were found were

2

found packaged in a manner similar to the one in her pocket, the

3

same color as the one found in her pocket.

4

So I would suggest that it's important that we be

5

allowed to show, because intent is a critical issue here that

6

there was no mistake and there was knowledge on her part.

7

fact, also that she lived at this location, that she was

8

familiar with the other defendant who was charged with the

9

other controlled substances that were found at the scene.

10

In

There's a bill that comes to that address showing that

11

in fact she does live there. As a matter of fact, she told one,

12

of the officers she had no idea what was going on. Well, I think

13

it would be important to show what was observed at the scene so

14

the jury can make a decision of whether or not she should1 have

15

known or could -- did know what was going on as opposed to merely

16

claiming, VXI knew nothing."

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. TAN:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. TAN:

Thank you.

Further response?,

And your Honor, if I may respond.
You may.

Having done the prelim, I can address the

21

issue.

22

with just one count, and the count is very specific.

23

has amended it in regards to the location.

24

residence, but it is the jail.

25

First of all, as the Information states, she is charged
The State

It's not the

The original Information yes, she was charged with being
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in possession at the location of 2965 South 700 East , which

2

was the addref3S on the search warrant.

3

amended this, and they're specifi cally point ing out to the Court,

4

and subsequently to the jury, that she was found trying to

5

smuggle drugs into the jail.

6

place at the 7th East 29th South location.

However, the State has

It has nothing to do with what took

Furthermore, it is just one count.

7

There iST nothing

8

else.

She is not charged with possession of drug paraphernalia.

9

She is not charged with any of the controlled substances that

10

were found at the location.

11

relevant to her as well, if in fact there are relevant issues of

12

her being at the location, why did the detectives and the SWAT

13

team and whoever else that entered the home and did the raid,

14

they cited a lot of other people.

15

If in fact the search warrant is

There were obviously one co-defendant we know of; I

16

believe there might be more.

17

or even mentioned to have any type of connection with any of

18

the controlled substances within the residential area.

19

charged with possession of a controlled substance at the jail.

20

However, Ms. Downs Was not cited

She is

I believe that if the State was to allow or to be

21

allowed to admit into evidence a search warrant and also any

22

background information, then, that the State's witnesses will

23

testify to, I think that's going to just confuse the jury.

24

They're going to try to then link Ms. Downs, who was charged with

25

possession of a controlled substance at the jail, with the fact
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that there were other people charged at the residential area

2

instead.

3

So I think, once again, it is highly prejudicial.

I

4

don't see any probative value involved.

I think it also will

5

confuse the jury because they're going to think that she is

6

charged with possession, and it is irrelevant if it's at the jail

7

or at the residential area.

8

would ask the Court not to allow the State to amend it to a

9

second degree of possession at a correctional facility, because

If that's the case, once again we

10

the jury is going to think, "Well, she's in possession.

11

she had the drugs back at the residential place instead of the

12

jail," then the Information is not correct.

13

argument on that, your Honor.

14
15

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

Maybe

So we would make an

If you wish to

respond.

16

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Just one other comment.

%

understanding

17

from the individuals that the defense has called as ^witnesses is

18

she has a very specific defense, and that is, "Those weren't my

19

pants."

20

tie in the drugs that were found in the pants with the drugs that

21

were found at the residence and with what was there to see at the

22

residence and to know.

23
24
25

So I think it's critical that the State be allowed to

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

to that?
MR. TAN:

Nothing else, your Honor.

Any further response
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THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

The —

again, the

2

issues are very appropriately addressed at this point, but I

3

do find that the evidence of how the defendant possessed the

4

methamphetamine, that the burden on the State is to prove beyond

5

a reasonable doubt her knowledge and intent into possessing the

6

methamphetamine, and that is the first part of the charge.

7

an element that the State must prove, and that this evidence goes

8

directly to Ms. Downs' knowledge and intent; therefore, it is

9

absolutely relevant.

It is

10

Whether or not it is so prejudicial that that

11

outweighs the relevance and would be unfair and unjust to allow

12

that evidence in, I do not find that that is the case.

13

that this gives context to the jury.

14

them, that it actually gives them context, but that in order to

15

prove any possession of a controlled substance the State has got

16

to prove that Ms. Downs possessed the methamphetamine.

17

Whether or not that

I think

It is not confusing to

is shown at the jail

or at

another

18

place is not more prejudicial to Ms. Downs.

It is not more

19

prejudicial to Ms. Downs that she possessed it somewhere else.

20 1 The same evidence of her possession is going to be coming in,
21

and so the fact that it comes in in the context that it was at

22

a search warrant at a residence where she was, and apparently

23

there's some evidence that she resides there, goes directly to

24

her knowledge and lack of mistake.

25

the case —

So that goes specifically to

the State's ability to enter this in its case in

-191 I chief.
2

Clearly if it is also the defense, and Ms. Downs has

3

no responsibility to even provide any defense, but clearly if

4

it does go to the defense, then -- then that information is

5

appropriate there.

6

be whether or not the State can even use it in their case in

7

chief.

8

element that they must prove this knowing possession, and that

9

it -- the fact that the possession may have occurred somewhere

But the first part of the ruling has got to

I find that this is absolutely relevant to the State's

10

besides the address and the correctional facility does not make

11

it irrelevant to the case.

12

The know -- anything that makes the possession more

13

knowing, more intentional, more likely than not is by definition

14

relevant, and the prejudice just simply is not extensive at all.

15

The only prejudice that goes to Ms. Downs is that she possessed

16

an unlawfully ~- an unlawful controlled substance.

17

That is something that is going to have to be shown by

18

the State or they're going to fail in the first element that they

19

must prove.

20

element that they must prove is not prejudicial to Ms. Downs.

21

That's information that the jury and the fact finders are going

22

to have to receive anyway.

23

The fact that it was somewhere besides the second

I am, however, going to make it be specific so that if

24

there -- the cross examination may also allow that this was

—

25

whether or not the search warrant was specifically to Ms. Downs.

-201 I That type of cross examination is appropriate as well.

It

2

doesn't look like there's any objection to this being why she was

3

taken to the jail.

4

the bench warrants for the justice courts.

5

be necessary, and I don't get -- sense from either argument that

6

there is any anticipation of the underlying warrants -- the

7

nature of the underlying warrants being admitted for any 404(b)

8

purposes.

It's simply that Ms. Downs was arrested and taken to

9

the jail.

Is that what evidence the State is anticipating as far

10
11

as any prior war —

They're not getting in the subject matter of
That doesn't seem to

bench warrants or convictions?

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Yes, your Honor.

We weren't going to

12

delve into the nature of the warrants.

We were merely going to

13

indicate that because that's the way that they normally do these

14

kinds of search warrants, execute these search warrants.

15

put people in restraints.

16

found warrants outstanding for Ms. Downs, and she was taken into

17

custody, arrested for that.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. TAN:

They

They then check on warrants and they

And -And your Honor, I believe just so that there

20

are no unexpected surprises when actually we have the jury before

21

us, I think that I may very well on cross examination dive into

22

that issue, because I think if in fact the Court will allow the

23

search warrant and some of the facts that transpired at the

24

residence to come in to testimony, I think it will be important

25

for the jury to know that even though she was picked up on

